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In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. [redacted] 148

CORNELIUS FULLBRIGHT,
Petitioner,

VERSUS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SHAPARD AND SHAPARD
By DAVID C. SHAPARD
200 Penn Square Bank Building
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Counsel for Petitioner

May, 1968

UTTERBACK TYPESETTING CO., 13 SO. WALKER, OKLAHOMA CITY, PH. CE 5-0030

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In the
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1967

No. .....

CORNELIUS FULLBRIGHT,
Petitioner,

VERSUS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Cornelius Fullbright, Petitioner, prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit entered in the above entitled case on the 4th day of April, 1968.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is unreported as yet and is reproduced in the Appendix to the Petition (Appendix A).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was entered on the 4th day of April, 1968. Rehearing was denied on the 30th day of April, 1968. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(1) and Rules of this Court.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Did the facts proven, justify conviction on the 5 charges as set forth in the complaint?

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which states in pertinent parts:

> "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;"

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal by petitioner (defendant), from the United States District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma in which the defendant was found guilty by the court in a trial and was sentenced to three years for violation of Title 26 U.S.C. Secs. 5601(a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(7), and 5604(a)(1).

The counts were as follows (R. 1):

COUNT ONE: That the defendant had in his possession and control, two stills and distilling apparatus which was not registered as required by Section 5719(a).

COUNT TWO: Defendant was charged with carrying on a business of a distillery without having given bond as required by law in violation of Sec. 5601(a)(4) Title 26 U.S.C.

COUNT THREE: The charge of making mash for production of distilled spirits on premises not the designated premises for a distilled spirits plant lawfully qualified to produce distilled spirits in violation of Sec. 5601 (a)(7) Title 26 U.S.C.

COUNT FOUR: Charged the defendant with transporting and possessing 74 gallons of distilled spirits contained in 74 one-gallon jugs all required to be stamped under Sec. 525(a)(2) Title 26 U.S.C.

COUNT FIVE: Provided that they had in their possession certain property which listed 150 feet of garden hose, 80 one-gallon empty jugs, one 55-gallon cooling barrel with a radiator condensor, four 5-gallon buckets, one 55-gallon mixing barrel, one lead lime and dome, 1,400 gallons of mash, three 55-gallon fermenters, two burners, 18 gallons of non-taxpaid distilled spirits and four 100-pound butane bottles which property and liquor was intended for use in violation of Sec. 5601(a)(1) 47 Title 26 U.S.C.

The evidence was presented in a statement made by the United States District Attorney in court, which was stipulated to as being the evidence presented. The court thereupon pronounced a conviction with no evidence of any witnesses other than the stipulation and the testimony as introduced in the Motion to Suppress.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be granted for the reason that the District Attorney did not prove or introduce any evidence which proved any of the 5 counts as set out in the indictment. By failing to prove said counts, the appellant is entitled to a dismissal and was entitled to a verdict of the District Court of "Not Guilty."

The entire evidence is shown in the record at page 34 through page 60.

The facts proven do not justify a conviction.

COUNT ONE. The defendant had in his possession and control, two stills and distilling apparatus which was not registered as required by Section 5179(a).

Not one single solitary place in that testimony is there any evidence in regard to Count One of the complaint. It is necessary for the United States Government to prove that the distilling apparatus was not registered as required by Section 5179(a) and there was no proof even attempted to show lack of registration.

COUNT TWO. The defendant was charged with carrying on a business of a distillery without having given bond as required by law in violation of Section 5601(a)(4) Title 26 United States Code.

Not one speck of testimony was given or stipulated to as to the lack of a bond or that the distilling was a type of process that requires a bond.

COUNT THREE. The charge of making mash for production of distilled spirits on premises not the designated premises of a distilled spirits plant lawfully qualified to produce distilled spirits in violation of Section 5601 (a)(7) Title 26 U.S.C.

Not one iota of evidence was shown that the mash was produced on such premises or that it was not a designated premises for a distilled spirits plant lawfully qualified to produce distilled spirits.

COUNT FOUR. Provided that the defendant did transport and possess 74 gallons of distilled spirits contained in 74 one-gallon jugs all required to be stamped under provision of 525(a)(2) Title 26 U.S.C.

While it is true that the general statement was made in the testimony presented by the State by stipulation for the Court's consideration that there were no stamps on the distilled spirits. The statute in this matter which is Section 5205(a)(2) provides that there are specific instances where stamps are not required:

(a) Distilled spirits lawfully withdrawn from bond for consumption on the premises. No evidence was shown that this was not one of the exceptions and that it was not for consumption on the premises at all.

(b) Said distilled spirits in customs' custody and this could have been in customs' custody. No showing was made as to the reputation of the defendant or that he was not a customs' employee.

(c) Provided that if it is in the actual process of rectification, blending or bottling or in the process of manufacturing, that it does not have to be stamped and there is no showing that this was not the case.

(d) Provided a general section that Section 5205(a) does not apply to any distilled spirits on which no internal revenue tax is required to be paid, and there was no showing that this was the type of distilled spirits that required a tax to be paid on it.

(e) Provided that if it is not intended for sale or for use in manufacturing or production of any article intended for sale that no stamp is required. There was no showing or evidence whatsoever in connection with this matter.

(f) The section does not apply if it is in the hands of a regular established common carrier receiving

transport or for transportation and delivery of distiled spirits in the course of business or as a common carrier.

No showing was made in any of the proof offered by the Government that the distilled spirits did not come under one of these exceptions.

COUNT FIVE. Provided that they had in their possession certain property and then listed 150 feet of garden hose, 80 one-gallon empty jugs, one 55-gallon cooling barrel with a radiator condenser, four 5-gallon buckets, one 55-gallon mixing barrel, one lead lime and dome, 1,400 gallons of mash, three 55-gallon fermenters, two burners, 18 gallons non-taxpaid distilled spirits and four 100-pound butane bottles which property and liquor was intended for use in violation of Section 5601(a)(1) 47 Title 26 United States Code.

Not one bit of evidence was ever introduced to show anything in relation to any of these items. No testimony was introduced saying that any of the above items were ever seen or present. Not one bit of evidence was stipulated to or introduced in support of Count Five.

In *Brinegar* v. *United States*, 338 U.S. 160, 93 L.Ed. 1879 the Court said at page 1889:

> "Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard."

Thus *no* proof on the five (5) counts upon which a conviction is based has deprived the defendant (petitioner) of "due process."

In *Beal* v. *United States,* 32 F.2d 1002, and in *Edwards* v. *United States,* 7 F.2d 357 the Court held where evidence in a case is as consistent with innocence as with guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained. The evidence must exclude every other hypothesis but that of guilt.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above stated, petitioner respectfully suggests that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

SHAPARD AND SHAPARD
By DAVID C. SHAPARD
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Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Counsel for Petitioner

May, 1968

APPENDIX A

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Tenth Circuit
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 9721—JANUARY TERM, 1968

Cornelius Fullbright	:	
	:	
Appellant,	:	
	:	Appeal From the
vs.	:	United States District Court
	:	For the Western District of
United States of America,	:	Oklahoma
	:	
Appellee.	:	

David C. Shapard of Shapard and Shapard, for Appellant. John E. Green, Assistant Attorney General (B. Andrew Potter, U. S. Attorney, with him on the brief) for the Appellee.

Before MURRAH, Chief Circuit Judge, HILL, Circuit Judge, and CHRISTENSEN, District Judge.

CHRISTENSEN, District Judge.

Appellant and two co-defendants were found guilty in a non-jury trial of violating five sections of the federal Internal Revenue Liquor Laws.[1] Appellant appeals, claim-

[1] 26 U.S.C.A. § 5601(a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(7), § 5604(a)(1), and § 5686(a).

ing that his conviction was based upon illegally obtained evidence.

These are the facts without substantial dispute: On the night of April 6, 1967, federal investigators for the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue Service, acting upon information received from an unnamed informant, who they stated was a "reliable" source of information, went upon the farm of one Marzett, a co-defendant of appellant, and took up positions for observation of a house and shed from a distance. With the aid of binoculars, they observed through an open door the three defendants operating a still inside the shed, appellant in particular being recognized. They also watched the defendants load bottles of distilled spirits from the shed into a 1957 Ford automobile, and then saw the Ford leave the premises followed by a 1965 Chevrolet driven by appellant. The investigators followed the two cars for several miles, never losing sight of them, and then stopped and searched the cars and arrested the occupants. During the search, seventy-four gallons of non-taxpaid distilled spirits were found in the Ford. Thereafter, the investigators secured a warrant for search of the Marzett premises, which search took place that same night and revealed two distilleries, 1,400 gallons of mash, other miscellaneous distilling apparatus and eighteen gallons of non-taxpaid distilled spirits.

A motion to suppress all of the evidence was made at a pre-trial hearing and renewed at the trial without avail.

The designated points in appellant's brief are concerned specifically with claimed errors of the trial court relating to informer testimony.[2] We reserve until later

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[2] "I. Where the Alcohol Tax Unit Investigator received reports several times prior to the search . . . the search without a warrant is inexcusable and the search unreasonable.

"II. The mere statement by an officer that the informant is reliable is a conclusion and is not sufficient to justify a search or a search warrant, without further information as to how he received the information and from what source and its reliability."

further reference to these expressed contentions to discuss a more serious problem only obliquely touched upon in the briefs, but of which point was made in the oral argument.

Appellant's position in its most persuasive light is that the arrests and the search of the automobiles were based upon information gained by the agents through an illegal search while they were trespassers upon the Marzett premises, so that the evidence should be ruled inadmissible under the "poisoned tree" doctrine. The government denies that there was any unreasonable search and asserts that in any event the appellant Fullbright had no standing to object, being without proprietary interest in the Marzett premises.

The definition of an "aggrieved" person is not as limited as appellee would imply. A narrow view of Rule 41(e) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been rejected and standing has been extended under varying circumstances to those whose rights of privacy have been invaded by searches or seizures directed against them. Under the circumstances of this case the appellant had standing to question the legality of any search of the Marzett premises.[3]

When the investigators made their initial observation, the door to the shed was open and its light was sufficient to reveal what was going on. The extent of the investigators' action at the time was to look.[4] And the use of

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[3] Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, at 362 U.S. pp. 260, 261, 267; Elbel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1014; Murray v. United States, 351 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1965); Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1965). Cf. Sumrall v. United States, 382 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1967); Cochran v. United States, ____F.2d____ (10th Cir. 1968).

[4] Cf. Trujillo v. United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961); Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Strickland, 62 F. Supp. 468 (D.C.S.Car. 1945).

binoculars did not change the character or admissibility of the evidence or information gained.[5] It has been consistently held that open fields are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.[6] The investigator here did not make a "search" of any papers, house, persons, or effects in the usual sense but rather made distant observations of a house and shed the direct search of which we shall assume would have been constitutionally prohibited without a warrant as being within the "curtilage."[7] If the investigators had physically breached the curtilage there would be little

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[5] United States v. McCall, 243 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1957).

[6] Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898; Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956); McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967); Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953).

In *Hester,* supra, revenue agents concealed themselves fifty to one-hundred yards from a house, saw Hester come from the house, hand a bottle to another man, and arrested them both without a warrant. Speaking of the claim made that there was an illegal search Mr. Justice Holmes for the court wrote:

"The officers had no warrant for search or arrest . . . It is obvious that even if there had been a trespass the above testimony was not obtained by an illegal search or seizure. The defendant's own acts, and those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar, and the bottle...

"It is enough to say that, apart from the justification, the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects' is not extended to the open fields . . ."

[7] "Curtilage" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, 3rd Edition, as "A yard within the fence surrounding a house." It has been otherwise defined as "The enclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling house." Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Ed.). The legal definition as will be seen from cases hereafter cited is not so precise but depends also on related circumstances. The term was of special importance at common law since the breaking and entering of a building outside the curtilage did not constitute burglary. Blackstone's Commentaries Book IV Ch. 16, p. 224-225 (Lewis' Edition p. 1620); United States v. Vlahos, 19 F. Supp. 166 (D. Oregon 1937).

doubt that any observations made therein would have been proscribed.[8] But observations from outside the curtilage of activities within are not generally interdicted by the Constitution. Indeed, to so hold might require passing officers to close their eyes to the commission of felonies on front door steps. The observations from the field sustained in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898, supra, penetrated the immediate vicinity of the home where the plaintiff in error lived.[9] By this we do not mean to say that surveillance from outside a curtilage under no circumstances could constitute an illegal search in view of the teachings of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). It is our opinion, however, that on the record before us in light of *Hester*[10] the observations in question may not be deemed an unreasonable search if they were made from outside the curtilage of the Marzett farm.

The word "houses" in the Fourth Amendment has been been extended by the courts to include the curtilage. Appellant contends that the agents entered the curtilage of the Marzett homestead when they drew within one-hundred yards of the house. Cases are cited which have held that the curtilage included a barn seventy to eighty yards from the house and separated by a driveway,[11] the position of cattle which were in a lot adjacent to a barn about one-hundred yards from the house,[12] and to a barn of unstated distance from the house but where "it was a small farm with a dwelling house and barn to the left as

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[8] See Brinlee v. State, 403 P.2d 253 (Okl. 1965).

[9] See also Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953), supra, where the observations were from a point apparently outside the curtilage but immediately adjacent thereto. Cf. Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957).

[10] Cited again since *Katz* in apparent recognition of its continuing vitality in James H. Harris v. United States, ____U.S.____ (1968).

[11] Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955).

[12] Brinlee v. State of Oklahoma, 403 P.2d 253 (Okl. 1965), supra.

you faced the premises."[13] None of these decisions, however, furnishes guides which are controlling here, and their facts are distinguishable. In *Hester*, supra, the vantage point held in effect not to be within the curtilage was approximately the distance the officers were from the shed in the present case, between fifty to one-hundred yards from the home. This court has said:[14]

> "Whether the place searched is within the curtilage is to be determined from the facts, including its proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the family."

The record is not entirely clear concerning the situation of the shed in question with reference to the Marzett house, nor as to the investigators' position in relation to the house. There is an illustrative plat which shows the shed's relative location upon the farm in general. It is also mentioned in the evidence that the agents were "75 to 100 yards from the shed which was 75 to 100 yards to the east of the residence" and that the agents had crossed what presumably was the boundary fence of the farm, then a field and another little fence to reach their position for observation. No showing was made of the relationship of the area from which the observations were made to the house and shed other than by the estimated distances separating them and the fact that two fences had been crossed, or concerning any enclosures that may have surrounded them or segregated the ordinary uses of particular areas. There was no testimony from the landowner or anyone else that the place from which the observations were made was within any yard or other enclosure related in use or purpose to the shed or house. The only question directly touching the point was put to one of the investigators: "Q.

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[13] Rosencranz v. United States, 256 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966).

[14] Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956).

Were you on the curtilage? A. No, sir. I was not." Aside from what already has been noticed, this conclusion was not thrown into question and the counsel for the appellant did not further examine concerning it.

The burden was upon the appellant as movant to establish that a search involved a protected area or person.[15] We conclude that he failed to sustain that burden and that the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was supported by substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

In view of the determination that the observations of the officers did not constitute an unreasonable search, immaterial is the contention of appellant that information received from an unidentified informant would not have justified either a search or a search warrant without proof that the informer had been reliable in the past and of other circumstances.[16] The only warrant secured by the officers was for search of the Marzett premises, based in part upon their prior personal observations of the operations of the still and appellant's participation. The warrant was not issued in necessary reliance upon the statements of the informant, nor were the search of the automobile and the arrest based upon his information, for as has been seen the officers were acting upon probable cause stemming from their valid observation of illegal activities prior to any search or arrest. An interesting variation of the point is advanced in appellant's second contention that since the investigators already had information from the informer, they should have obtained a warrant

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[15] Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307. See also Murray v. United States, 333 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 380 U.S. 527, 85 S.Ct. 1345, 14 L.Ed.2d 266, same, 351 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1965); Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Masterson, 383 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1967).

[16] Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151. See also United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 265 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1959).

before making their distant observations of the Marzett property. This and appellant's related contention that the information from the informer was not demonstrated by the government to have been sufficient to justify the observations, much less any search, tend to be self-defeating as well as immaterial on the present record.

There is no merit to appellant's contention made for the first time by supplemental brief following oral argument here, that even though the motion to suppress is held to have been properly denied the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to sustain the convictions. Untimeliness is fatal to this contention, particularly in view of the absence of any indication that there has been a miscarriage of justice[17] and the implied representations at the trial that there was no defense other than through the motion to suppress the seized evidence.[18] Beyond this, however, the stipulations and exhibits received at the trial and the testimony *from a prior hearing incorporated by reference reveal circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the non-registration of the still and other* essential elements of the charges now questioned by appellant.[19]

AFFIRMED.

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[17] Brooks v. United States, 330 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied at 379 U.S. 852; Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Rutkin, 189 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1951), affirmed 343 U.S. 130, 72 S.Ct. 571, 96 L.Ed. 833. Cf. Strickland v. United States, 339 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1965).

[18] "THE COURT: How long will it take to try this case?

"MR. SHAPARD (Attorney for the Defendant): Your Honor, in this matter we will concede all the facts in the matter and would like to offer in evidence our testimony at the motion to suppress and a diagram of the property and a deed to the property.

"We have no further matters in connection with this, and we would stipulate to whatever the district attorney wants to do as far as the facts of the still and the various other items.

"We would like to reserve our rights on the motion to suppress . . ."

[19] Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89, 53 S.Ct. 532, 77 L.Ed. 1051 (1933).

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

CORNELIUS FULLBRIGHT, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 148

CORNELIUS FULLBRIGHT, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner was indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and, after waiving a jury trial, was convicted by the court on all five counts, namely, (1) possessing and controlling two unregistered stills and distilling apparatus, (2) carrying on the business of a distiller without giving bond, (3) making mash fit for the production of distilled spirits on premises which had not been properly designated for that purpose, (4) transporting and possessing 74 gallons of distilled liquor in contain-

ers to which revenue stamps had not been affixed, and (5) possessing property and liquor intended for use in violation of liquor laws and regulations, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5179(a), 5205(a)(2), 5601(a)(1), (4) and (7), 5604(a)(1) and 5686(a) (R. 1-3). He was sentenced to imprisonment for three years on count 1; sentence on the remaining counts was suspended and petitioner placed on probation for three years, to commence upon release from serving the sentence on count 1 (R. 13, 22). The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. A. i-viii).

Petitioner's sole contention in this Court—an issue raised for the first time in this case in a supplemental brief following oral argument in the court of appeals—is that the evidence does not sustain his convictions. While this claim of insufficiency of evidence would in no event merit plenary consideration by this Court, the court of appeals' determination that the evidence was adequate is clearly correct.[1]

At the beginning of his trial, petitioner's retained counsel stated (R. 34):

> Your Honor, in this matter we will concede all the facts in the matter and would like to offer in evidence our testimony at the Motion to Suppress and a diagram of the property and a deed to the property.
>
> We have no further matters in connection with this, and we would stipulate to whatever the District Attorney wants to do as far as the facts of the still and the various other items.

[1] The court below observed that the untimeliness of the claim would be fatal, but nevertheless went on to find the evidence sufficient (Pet. App. A. viii).

We would like to reserve our rights on the Motion to Suppress.

He further stated that he was asking the court to reconsider his previously litigated motion to suppress as a defense on the merits (R. 35).

The testimony adduced on the motion to suppress consisted solely of the testimony of Wheeler, an Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Unit investigator. Wheeler testified that, at about 8:00 p.m. on April 6, 1967, he and investigator Carpenter were using binoculars to observe a shed on the premises of co-defendant Marzett. A 1957 Ford and a 1964 or 1965 Chevrolet pickup truck drove to the shed. When the shed door was opened, Wheeler could see inside; he observed petitioner and Marzett, with whom he was acquainted, and co-defendant McLaurin. He was also able to see a still in operation. Petitioner and McLaurin loaded the 1957 Ford, and both vehicles left the premises at about 9:00 p.m. Wheeler and Carpenter followed in their own car for several miles and then stopped both vehicles, which were traveling about ten yards apart, McLaurin in the Ford, petitioner and Mrs. Marzett in the Chevrolet. All were placed under arrest and the two vehicles searched. In the Ford were 74 gallons of whiskey. A warrant for the search of the Marzett premises was obtained shortly before midnight (R. 46-52).

The parties stipulated to a chemist's report showing that three samples of whiskey and mash, found at the premises and in the Ford, consisted of one-half pint of fermented mash fit for distillation, alcoholic content 7.7%, one half pint of uncolored moonshine

whiskey, alcoholic content 89.3 proof and one-half pint of the same, 107.5 proof (R. 35-36, 41). It was further stipulated that Carpenter would testify substantially in the same manner as Wheeler had; would further testify that a search of petitioner at the time of his arrest disclosed a key which fitted the trunk of the Ford in which the 74 gallons of whiskey were found; and that one of the keys from the key ring which was taken from the ignition of the Ford fitted the shed on the Marzett premises (R. 36-37). Two other investigators, it was stipulated, would testify as to their observation of the occurrences at the time of arrest, that there were no signs at the premises and no strip stamps attached to the spirits (R. 36, 38). The case was submitted for the court's decision without argument; petitioner asked only to be allowed to submit a brief in support of his motion to suppress. In this context, the court below was fully justified in finding the evidence sufficient to establish guilt.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.

FRED M. VINSON, JR.,
Assistant Attorney General.

BEATRICE ROSENBERG,
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JUNE 1968.

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